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Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT this approach (Kingstone, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2009; Risko, Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2013; Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010; Hari & Kujala 2009 , Hietanen et al., 2008 . In studies investigating the effects of direct gaze (eye contact), for example, the use of images versus live persons as stimuli has potentially a substantial influence on the observed responses. Obviously, passive viewing of an image of a person displaying direct gaze does not require similar reactive responses as seeing a person gazing oneself in a live social interaction. Facing a live person with direct gaze involves being the actual object of the other person's attention. In this situation, direct gaze is a strong signal of a possible initiation of interaction. Facing a live person involves 'online' mentalizing consisting of constant implicit prediction and comparison processes characteristic to active interaction, as opposed to 'offline' mentalizing, i.e., passive viewing of such an interaction (cf., Schilbach, 2014) . Indeed, previous research has shown that direct gaze is accompanied with increased autonomic nervous system activation and brain activity associated with approach motivation when facing a real person, but not when viewing an image (e.g., Hietanen et al. 2008; Pönkänen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011) . Eye contact with a real person is sufficient for initiation of these autonomic preparatory processes.
However, an interesting question is whether these processes could be initiated with voluntarily imagining a social interaction involving eye contact or whether they are specific to online mentalizing.
A probable driving force for the differential responses to eye contact between a live gaze and a pictorial gaze stimulus is the participant's experience of being the object of another person's attention. In a previous study, the experience of being the object of the other person's attention during eye contact was explicitly isolated and manipulated in two conditions (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) . The participants were facing a live stimulus person and, in one condition, they believed that the stimulus person was also seeing them, whereas, in the other condition, they believed that the stimulus person could not see them (due to a mock one-way mirror inserted 5 Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT between them). Enhanced autonomic (skin conductance and heart rate deceleration) and attentionsensitive brain responses (P3 event-related potential) as well as higher levels of self-evaluated public self-awareness and social presence to eye contact versus averted gaze were observed only when the participants believed that they were being seen. Thus, the study provided strong evidence that the essential factor underlying the increased responses to eye contact was the knowledge of being seen by another person. In another study, it was further investigated whether the mere belief of being seen by another person is sufficient to trigger the enhanced response even when the viewer does not see the other person at all, or whether these responses are intimately tied to seeing the other person during the eye contact (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015b) . Despite heightened selfawareness -attesting of differences in higher-order cognition -the belief of being seen by itself did not elicit corresponding physiological responses in the absence of any visual information about the other person. This suggests that the eye contact effects are conditional, not only on the observer spontaneously believing to be seen by the other person, but also on that the observer himself/herself sees the other person. Thus, previous research has shown that a top-down manipulation of the participants' beliefs of being seen or not by another person during eye contact has a strong effect on whether the eye contact results in enhanced physiological and subjective responses or not.
However, it remains possible that perceiving a person's image and voluntary mentalizing that the person sees oneself could also trigger similar enhanced physiological and subjective responses spontaneous online mentalizing.
In this study, we were interested in investigating whether the participants' voluntary mentalizing of being seen or not by another person is powerful enough to result in modulation of the physiological, behavioural, and subjective responses in a condition when they are not facing another, live person, but a pre-recorded video of a person. We instructed the participants to immerse as vividly as possible in an imagined social interaction with a pre-recorded stimulus person on a video clip and asked them to imagine the video person as a real, living person sitting in front of 6 Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT them in the same room. For one group of participants, we also asked them to mentalize that the other person was able to see them, whereas the other group of participants was asked to imagine that a half-silvered mirror was placed between them and the other person so that they could see the other person but this person could not see the participant. Thus, the only difference between the conditions was in the participants' attribution of the other person's ability to see oneself. The contrast between the mutual and one-way visibility was created in a comparable way in a previous study (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) .
In the present study, we collected three types of data: participants' autonomic responses (skin conductance responses and heart rate), looking behaviour (gaze tracking), and subjective evaluations. Previous studies have shown larger skin conductance responses (SCRs) in response to faces with direct versus averted gaze, but only when the faces were presented live and not when presented as pictures (Helminen et al., 2011; Hietanen et al., 2008; Pönkänen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011) . Moreover, as cited above, the enhanced SCRs in response to a live face with direct gaze are also conditional to the observer's belief of being seen by the other person (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) . In the present study, we measured SCRs to investigate whether the voluntary mentalizing of being seen or not is powerful enough to modulate sympathetic affective arousal (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000) in response to eye contact also when facing a video-clip of a person. In a similar vein, we investigated whether heart rate (HR) deceleration in response to eye contact is modulated by the observer's condition of mentalizing. HR deceleration response is an index of attention orienting to external stimuli (Graham & Clifton, 1966) , amplified by affectively and motivationally salient stimuli (Bradley, 2009; Lang & Bradley, 2010) . Consistent with behavioral studies showing that direct gaze captures and holds visual attention (e.g., Böckler et al., 2014; Conty et al., 2006 , Senju & Hasegawa, 2005 von Grünau & Anston, 1995) , previous studies have shown enhanced HR deceleration responses to direct versus averted gaze (Akechi et al., 2013) . However, also this response has been shown to be modulated by the participants' belief of whether the other person can Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT see or cannot see him/her during eye contact (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) . In line with the physiological measures, subjective evaluation of social presence is also modulated by the belief of whether another person can see oneself or not (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) . Therefore, we measured social presence as well as affective arousal and valence also in the present study.
Previous studies using static and dynamic facial stimulus images have indicated that the eye region is fixated longer than other face regions (e.g., Birmingham, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008; Foulsham, Walker, & Kingstone, 2010) . Fixation times in the eye region, nevertheless, depend on (eye) gaze direction: direct gaze has been shown to receive fixations with shorter latencies and longer durations (dwell times) than averted gaze both for still facial images and for animated video clips (Palanica & Itier 2011; Wieser et al., 2009 ). Importantly, gazing on the eye-region has been found to be further modulated depending on whether the viewers have been looking at live people or people appearing in videos: in case of eye contact, the eye region of a live person was fixated longer than other parts of the stimulus but not so in the case of a pre-recorded video of the person (Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2013) . Thus, because previous studies have shown that observers' gazing behaviour on another person's eye region may differ depending on this person's ability to see the observer (i.e., live people vs. videos), we were naturally interested in investigating whether our mental state manipulation would influence the participants' gazing behaviour in this study.
Based on the results from previous experiments, we expected that voluntary mentalizing would have a similar effect as spontaneous mentalizing on the autonomic responses to direct relative to averted gaze: Both SCR and HR deceleration responses to direct gaze would be enhanced only when the participants voluntarily mentalize that the person on the video is able to see them.
We also expected that direct gaze would hold overt attention longer compared to averted gaze, and, furthermore, that voluntary mentalizing of being seen, compared to not being seen, by the person on the video would increase this difference in the overall fixation dwell times. size was estimated based on the samples and effect sizes of a previous study (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) . To examine the adequacy of the sample, an a priori type of power analysis for a 2
x 2 mixed design repeated measures ANOVA was conducted after the experiment using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) , with the parameters of 95% power, expected effect size of at least 0.1 ( ) (.23 in Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) , an alpha level of .05, the default within-subjects measurement correlation of .5, and a non-sphericity correction value (ε) of 1. This calculation suggested a total sample size of 24 participants (12 participants/group). Procedure. Following consenting to participate and attachment of the electrodes, participants were seated in front of a computer in a darkened laboratory room. The participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups (30 participants in each), except for that the gender distribution was balanced between the groups (10 male and 20 female participants in each group). The experimental groups did not differ from each other with respect to participants' age, t(58) = .74, p = .46. Participants in both groups were asked to perform a mentalizing task. In both groups, the participants were encouraged to imagine as vividly as possible that there is another person sitting opposite to them, and that they would know and sense that the person can hear and could even touch them. In one group, the participants were instructed to mentalize that the person 10 Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT appearing on video would see the participant just like the participant saw this person (mentalizing of being seen). For the other group, the participants were instead asked to imagine that a one-sided mirror (such as those seen in TV police series) was placed between them and they were asked to mentalize that, therefore, the video person could not see the participant (mentalizing of not being seen). The experimental groups did not differ in any other respect except for this aspect of instructions given to them before the experimental task.
Stimuli and procedure
In each gaze direction condition, the stimuli were shown 8 times (for the lateral gaze direction, 4 stimuli with gaze direction to the left and 4 to the right). Participants thus viewed a total of 24 videos. In each gaze condition, a half of the stimuli pictured a male model and the other half a female model. Different gaze directions were presented in pseudorandom order so that the same gaze direction of a given person could not appear more than twice in a row. The inter-stimulus interval was 20 seconds and the total data collection took about 10 minutes for each participant.
Following the experimental procedure, two self-assessment questionnaires were administered to the participants in both groups: the social presence form (SPF) (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) , self-assessment SAM manikins measuring the experienced arousal and valence (Bradley & Lang, 1994) . The participants in each group were asked to evaluate these dimensions of their subjective experience during the experimental task on 7-point scales. Finally, the participants were briefly debriefed. All participants reported having no trouble in following the instructions for the experimental task. as an overall fixation dwell time in the eye region to be meaningfully extracted from the data.
Data acquisition

Data analysis SCR.
The SCR data were re-sampled offline to 100 Hz and filtered with a 10-Hz low-pass filter. The skin conductance response was defined as a maximum amplitude change from the baseline level (at the stimulus onset) during a 5-s time period starting 1 s after the stimulus onset. In case there was more than a 0.1 μS amplitude rise during the first second after stimulus onset, the trial was rejected. Of all trials 7.7% were eliminated due to this criterion or because of a technical error. The data were averaged for each condition and gaze direction for each participant, including those with a maximum amplitude below 0.01 μS (i.e. zero responses); this calculation results in the magnitude of the skin conductance responses; a measure that combines response size and response frequency (cf., Dawson et al., 2000) .
The SCR data were not normally distributed, and this was corrected for by applying a lntransformation. The width of the inter-quartile range (wIQR) was calculated for each gaze direction.
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Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT Data of those participants whose responses were three wIQRs further from either edge of the IQR were identified as outliers and excluded from further analyses (5 participants). All analyses were conducted with normally distributed transformed values. Nevertheless, the untransformed values were used to describe the mean values.
HR. The ECG data were prepared offline for the analysis by measuring the time intervals between two successive R-waves (inter-beat interval, IBI) using an in-house (Matlab-based) algorithm. In this phase, trials with excessive signal distortion were removed from the data before further analyses (less than 1%). Data from three participants in the imagined mutual visibility group were rejected from further analyses because of poor data quality.
The IBIs were quantified and assigned to 1-s intervals for a 9-s period including 3 s prestimulus within each trial. IBIs were then converted to beats per minute (bpm) and averaged across trials for each condition. The average of the bpms during the pre-stimulus period served as a baseline, from which the bpm of each post-stimulus 1-s interval was subtracted, yielding the HRchange scores with which the analyses were performed.
Gaze tracking. AOIs for the eye region were defined for each video person to measure fixation dwell times to the eye region in each condition. The eye region was defined as covering horizontally an area between the left and right outline of the face and vertically an area between the inner (lower) edges of the eyebrows and the halfway of the nasal bridge (see Fig. 1 ). The area was individually adjusted for each stimulus person but held similar across all gaze directions. The dwell time was calculated as the total sum of fixation times inside the AOI across all trials in each gaze condition. The dwell times can thus be viewed as 'macro-fixations', organizing all individual fixations into one large-scale scale measure (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000) .
Data from two participants were rejected due to excessively poor data quality, leaving gaze tracking data of 29 participants from each experimental group for the analyses. 
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The data from gaze tracking and autonomic measures were analyzed by conducting a mixed design 3 × 2 repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) with a within-subjects factor of Gaze direction (direct, lateral, downcast), and a between-subjects factor of Condition of mentalizing (being seen, not being seen). For the analysis of the HR-change scores, a withinsubjects factor Time interval was added (time interval after the stimulus onset: 0-1 s, 1-2 s, …, 5-6 s). Greenhouse-Geisser correction procedures were applied when appropriate. Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT mentalizing of being seen condition, but not in the mentalizing of not being seen condition (see Fig.   2b ). Point-by-point comparisons between the experimental groups (Condition of mentalizing)
Results
Questionnaires
showed that heart rate change differences were significant for all 1-s time-intervals between 2 and 6 seconds post-stimulus, all ps < .03. However, no main or interaction effects involving the factor of Gaze direction reached significance (ps > .16). Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT hypothesis of no interaction raw effect (zero), and the alternative hypotheses of any effect with a value between zero and the theoretically maximum interaction raw effects, resulted in BSCR = 2.78
and BHR = 1.86.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated whether people's voluntary mentalizing of being seen or not by another person is powerful enough to result in modulation of physiological and gaze tracking responses to eye contact also when they are not facing another, live person, but a pre-recorded video of a person. In previous studies, greater autonomic responses (skin conductance and heart rate deceleration) to eye contact versus averted gaze were observed only if the participants saw another, live person (Hietanen et al., 2008) and when seeing a live person, if they believed they were seen by that person, (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) . The present results showed, however, that the gaze direction of a person appearing on a video did not have an effect on skin conductance or heart rate deceleration responses, no matter whether the participant voluntarily mentalized that the person was able to see them or not. This result seems to corroborate the idea that seeing another, live person and the belief of being seen by that person are essential components for enhanced autonomic responses to eye contact. The present results suggest that the implicit mentalizing processes, which are triggered by seeing a live person with direct gaze and which are likely to be necessary for enhanced autonomic responses, are context-sensitive and spontaneous, and cannot be reproduced under voluntary cognitive control.
Previous studies by Teufel and colleagues showed that visual attention orienting by gaze direction cues (Teufel et al., 2010) and sensory visual adaptation to gaze direction stimuli (Teufel et al., 2009) Regarding the total lack of gaze direction effect on autonomic responses, the present results are compatible with previous studies showing that, in contrast to gaze direction of a live person, the gaze direction of a static facial image presented on a computer monitor did not have an effect on autonomic or brain responses (Hietanen et al. 2008; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, Leppänen, & Hietanen, 2011; Pönkänen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011) . Thus, it seems that the lack of gaze direction effect by face images in previous studies was not due to the fact that, unlike a face of a live person, the static face images were devoid of any kinematic information. Instead, together with previous results, the present results provide further support to our suggestions that the lack of gaze direction effects on autonomic responses by facial images, whether static pictures or dynamic video clips, is related to the fact that a person appearing in an image does not look back to the observer; the self is not seen by another mind (Hietanen et al., 2008; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, Leppänen, & Hietanen, 2011; Pönkänen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011) .
The condition of mentalizing, however, did exert an influence on HR deceleration: regardless of gaze direction, HR deceleration, a physiological marker related to attention orienting, was greater in the 'being seen' than in the 'not being seen' mentalizing condition. This result seems to suggest that the participants were, after all, able to voluntarily mentalize being seen or not by a person appearing on a video and that, in the 'being seen' condition, the presentation of the stimulus person resulted in enhanced orienting of attention. However, drawing this conclusion may not be warranted, especially because the self-evaluations and the skin conductance responses did not show the same pattern. It is also possible that the 'not being seen' condition was cognitively more demanding than the 'being seen' condition. The 'not being seen' condition required imagination of 18 Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT the interaction plus the presence of the one-way window preventing the stimulus person from seeing the self. Thus, it required intensive allocation of attention and, therefore, the attention orienting triggered by the external stimulus was attenuated in this condition. This speculation is supported by the finding that, in the 'not being seen' condition, there actually seemed to be a slight HR acceleration response indicative of sympathetic nervous system activation. Such a response might stem from increased cognitive effort, which has been associated with a HR acceleration response (e.g., Kennedy & Scholey, 2000) .
Interestingly, stimulus gaze direction had an effect on participants' own gaze behavior: the eye region of faces with direct gaze was viewed longer than the eye region of faces with averted gaze. This finding is in line with results from previous studies showing that the eye regions of virtual characters, real persons appearing in still and video images as well as that of live stimulus persons were fixated longer when the character/person was in eye contact compared to when looking away (Palanica & Itier, 2006; Wieser et al., 2009; Freeth et al., 2013) . Gaze tracking data did not show, however, any effects by the mentalizing manipulation. Results from one previous study showed increased viewing of eye region in eye contact vs. looking away for live stimulus persons relative to video-transmitted persons (Freeth, et al., 2013) . Thus, compatible with the reasoning presented above, mentalizing of being seen by a person appearing in a video does not enhance viewing of the stimulus person's eye region similarly to when facing another person live.
Complying with the results from the measures of autonomic arousal, the subjective measures of social presence and affective arousal and valence did not differ between the mentalizing conditions. Compared with results from previous studies showing an increase in subjective measures when believing being seen vs. not being seen by another live person (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a , 2015b , this result adds up to the idea that the same mentalizing processes are not initiated in eye contact with a person appearing in a video as compared to eye contact with a live person. It seems that the autonomic and subjective responses to eye contact depend on appropriate
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Running head: MENTALIZING EYE CONTACT mentalizing processes -those reflecting the automatic contextual knowledge about being seen by another person.
An important issue for consideration is, of course, whether the lack of greater autonomic and subjective responses to eye contact in the 'being seen' vs. 'not being seen' condition reflected a lack of participants' capability of voluntarily imagining being in interaction with a person appearing in a video, or whether it reflected the fact that voluntary mentalizing is not able to trigger the same processes in response to eye contact as what spontaneous mentalizing is capable of. The experimental task seemed easy for the participants, as none of them reported of difficulties in completing the imagination task in debriefing, and we would have excluded data from any such participant reporting difficulties in the task from the analyses. For this reason, and also because we found a difference in the HR response between the conditions (even if it just reflected differential cognitive demands), we believe that the observed results could not have reflected a failure in the imagination task or in the experimental manipulation, but the fact that the voluntary mentalizing is not sufficient to initiate the autonomic responses specific to genuine eye contact. Also, the sample size (n = 60) should have been sufficient for observing even subtle differences in autonomic arousal ( = .1 vs.
= .23 in Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015a) , as suggested by the power analysis.
Bayesian statistical analyses indicated that support for the absence of genuine eye contact effects on autonomic responses is from 1.86 (HR) to 2.78 (SCR) times stronger than support for their existence. However, as conventionally Bs > 3 are taken to indicate substantial support for the null hypothesis (Dienes 2014), the data are not quite conclusive.
In conclusion, our findings revealed that imagining eye contact with a pre-recorded stimulus person does not lead to similar enhancement of physiological and subjective responses as eye contact with a living stimulus person. The measured eye contact effects thus seem to depend on possibility for interaction with a live person. This seems to pose an important challenge for 2 p η 2 p η information and communication technology mediated social interaction, and further points to the need to study eye contact effects as well as many other processes of social cognition in natural, social circumstances, instead of using computerized stimuli in impoverished laboratory settings.
